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Fairness perceptions and reservation wages - the behavioral
effects of minimum wage laws
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment we show that minimum wages have significant and lasting effects on
subjects' reservation wages. The temporary introduction of a minimum wage leads to a rise in subjects'
reservation wages which persists even after the minimum wage has been removed. Firms are therefore
forced to pay higher wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. As a
consequence, the employment effects of removing the minimum wage are significantly smaller than are
the effects of its introduction. The impact of minimum wages on reservation wages may also explain the
anomalously low utilization of subminimum wages if employers are given the opportunity of paying less
than a minimum wage previously introduced. It may further explain why employers often increase
workers' wages after an increase in the minimum wage by an amount exceeding that necessary for
compliance with the higher minimum. At a more general level, our results suggest that economic policy
may affect people's behavior by shaping the perception of what is a fair transaction and by creating
entitlement effects.
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Abstract: In a laboratory experiment we show that minimum wages have significant and lasting 
effects on subjects’ reservation wages. The temporary introduction of a minimum wage leads to 
a rise in subjects’ reservation wages which persists even after the minimum wage has been 
removed. Firms are therefore forced to pay higher wages after the removal of the minimum 
wage than before its introduction. As a consequence, the employment effects of removing the 
minimum wage are significantly smaller than are the effects of its introduction. The impact of 
minimum wages on reservation wages may also explain the anomalously low utilization of 
subminimum wages if employers are given the opportunity of paying less than a minimum wage 
previously introduced. It may further explain why employers often increase workers' wages after 
an increase in the minimum wage by an amount exceeding that necessary for compliance with 
the higher minimum. At a more general level, our results suggest that economic policy may 
affect people’s behavior by shaping the perception of what is a fair transaction and by creating 
entitlement effects.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
For decades, economists have been interested in the economic and social consequences of 
minimum wage laws. Important puzzles remain, however, despite much progress in both labor 
market theory and empirical analysis. First, several studies report anomalously low utilization of 
subminimum wages in situations where employers could actually pay workers less than the 
minimum [Freeman, Wayne and Ichniowski 1981; Katz and Krueger 1991, 1992; Manning and 
Dickens 2002]. Katz and Krueger [1992] found, for example, that the introduction of the 
opportunity to pay subminimum wages to youth had no discernible effect on teenage workers’ 
wages. This underutilization of the opportunity to pay less than the prevailing minimum 
occurred, even though the vast majority of firms paid a starting wage below the new hourly 
minimum immediately before it became effective. Second, there is evidence that minimum wage 
laws have so-called spillover effects [Card and Krueger 1995; Katz and Krueger 1992; Dolado, 
Felgueroso and Jimeno 1997; Teulings 2003; Teulings, Vogels and van Dieten 1998].1 For 
example, Katz and Krueger [1992] and Card and Krueger [1995] show that after an increase in 
the minimum wage, fast food restaurants increased wages for workers by an amount in excess of 
that necessary for compliance with the higher minimum wage. Third, the new minimum wage 
research in the 1990s questioned the conventional wisdom that increases in the legal minimum 
wage always cause a decrease in employment, in particular, if the minimum wage increase is 
modest [Card 1992; Card and Krueger 1994; Katz and Krueger 1992; Machin and Manning 
1994; Dolado, Kramarz, Machin, Manning Margolis and Teulings 1996]. Although these results 
remain contested, it is probably fair to say that they represent a considerable challenge to the 
conventional view of the employment effects of minimum wages [see, e.g., Neumark and 
Wascher 1992 and 2000; Card, Katz and Krueger 1994; Card and Krueger 2000].  
Why do profit maximizing employers not take advantage of the possibility of reducing 
wages below the legal minimum, and why do they pay more than the required minimum for 
those workers who earned less than the new minimum wage before it was introduced? We report 
the results of laboratory experiments that examine possible driving forces behind these 
phenomena in this paper. We provide, in particular, evidence showing why profit maximizing 
employers may find it profitable to pay workers much higher wages after the removal of a legal 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is the United Kingdom where no spillover effects have been found [Manning and Dickens 
2002].  
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minimum wage than before its introduction.2 This result provides a possible explanation for the 
anomalously low utilization of subminimum wage opportunities because these opportunities 
were typically introduced after a previous increase in the minimum wage. In addition, our data 
show why profit maximizing employers may find it optimal to pay wages above the minimum 
wage even if they paid wages much lower than the minimum wage before its introduction. This 
result provides an explanation for the second puzzle, i.e., why there are wage spillover effects. 
Finally, we report evidence suggesting that employers may neither find it optimal to decrease 
employment after the introduction of a binding minimum wage nor to increase employment after 
its removal.  
We identify the observed pattern of reservation wages as the driving force behind all these 
phenomena. Workers’ fairness concerns shape individual reservation wages in our experiment 
and give rise to upward sloping labor supply schedules at the firm level. We observe that the 
minimum wage strongly affects reservation wages, suggesting that it influences what is 
perceived as a fair wage. After the introduction of a minimum wage, workers’ reservation wages 
increase and a substantial share of the workers even exhibits reservation wages above the legal 
minimum. Profit maximizing firms are thus forced to pay wages above the minimum, which 
explains the spillover effect.3 After the removal of the minimum wage, workers’ reservation 
wages decrease somewhat; however, they still substantially exceed those before the introduction 
of the minimum wage. It seems that the minimum wage leads to a kind of ratchet effect in 
workers’ perception of what constitutes a fair wage. This means that individual firms face a 
tighter labor supply schedule after the removal of the minimum wage than before its 
introduction. Therefore, the payment of substantially higher wages after the removal of the 
minimum wage than before the introduction is a profit maximizing strategy. This finding 
explains why firms may find it unprofitable to utilize subminimum wage opportunities and 
echoes results reported in Katz and Krueger [1992]. They report that 62 percent of fast food 
restaurant managers not using the subminimum opportunity for youth believed they could not 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper we use the term "employer" or "firm" for subjects who are in the role of an employer in the 
laboratory experiment. The term "worker" is used for subjects who are in the role of a worker in the experiment. 
3 Flinn [2005] shows that minimum wages can also affect workers' reservation wages in search and matching 
models with wage bargaining. The reason is that the minimum wage changes the asset values of unemployment and 
employment. However, as firms and workers are exogenously rematched in every period of our experiment, these 
effects cannot play a role in our setup. Teulings [2005] provides an elegant explanation of spillover effects in an 
extended competitive model. Teuling’s explanation and our explanation in terms of changes in reservation wages 
are not mutually incompatible.  
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“attract qualified teenage workers at the subminimum wage” although the vast majority of these 
restaurants hired workers at less than the new minimum wage prior to its increase.4  
The pattern of reservation wages also shapes the employment effect of the minimum 
wage. Since workers’ fairness concerns impose an upward sloping labor supply constraint on 
individual firms, firms can increase employment if they pay higher wages. Theoretical analyses 
[Rebitzer and Taylor 1991; Manning 1995 and 2003; Burdett and Mortensen 1998; Bhaskar and 
To 1999] indicate that a minimum wage may actually increase employment under these 
circumstances. This is, however, not obvious in our context. As the minimum wage not only 
increases wages but also reservation wages, firms may also reduce employment. We find that 
the increase in reservation wages is not strong enough such that the introduction of a binding 
minimum wage has a positive net effect on employment. In addition, the asymmetric response 
of reservation wages to the introduction and the removal of the minimum wage is associated 
with asymmetric employment effects: employment decreases less after the removal of the 
minimum wage than it increased after the introduction of the minimum wage.5 
To what extent should one expect the behavioral forces identified in the experiment to be 
present in labor markets outside the laboratory as well? Although it is advisable to be cautious 
when generalizing findings from one empirical domain to another, we believe that the impact of 
minimum wages on reservation wages might well be present in labor markets outside the 
laboratory. First, fairness concerns, which shape reservation wages in our experiment, have been 
shown to affect laboratory behaviors even at rather high stake levels – up to three months’ 
income [Cameron 1999; Slonim and Roth 1997; Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougareva 2002]. Thus, 
the argument that stakes are higher in the ‘field’ than in the laboratory and that the laboratory 
results can therefore be dismissed as irrelevant, is on weak ground. Second, the argument that 
we used a rather narrow subject pool – students – in our experiment is also not compelling 
because evidence from representative experiments from Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland shows that the basic behavioral patterns observed in fairness related experiments 
with students also prevail in representative samples [Bellemare and Kröger 2004, Fehr et al. 
                                                 
4 The fact that reservation wages and, hence, actual wages remain high after the removal of the minimum wage may 
also inform us about the forces behind the adjustment of reservation wages over time. Our result suggests that 
actual wage payments which were previously experienced may strongly shape reservation wages. This finding may 
have important consequences for the debate regarding the compatibility of the “wage curve”, as documented by 
Blanchflower and Oswald [1994], and the Phillips curve. In particular, one condition for the compatibility of the 
wage curve approach with the Phillips curve approach is that past increases in real wages be fully reflected in 
current increases in reservation wages [Blanchard and Katz 1997, 1999]. 
5 Similar to our findings Kramarz and Philippon [2001] report for the French labor market between 1990 and 1998 
that the effects of labor cost increases and decreases caused by legal changes were not symmetric. 
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2002, Falk and Zehnder 2006]. Third, evidence from questionnaire studies with firms’ human 
resource managers – some of them even with representative samples of firms – suggests that 
workers’ fairness concerns play a prominent role in firm’s wage policies [Bewley 1999, Agell 
and Bennmarker 2003]. Finally, recent papers indicate that laboratory measures of social 
preferences can be good predictors of behavior in field settings. Karlan [2005] shows that 
reciprocity (i.e., trustworthiness) in trust games predicts subjects’ loan repayments one year after 
a laboratory experiment and Carpenter and Seki’s work [2005] suggests that laboratory 
measures of conditional cooperation forecast productivity in the work place.  
At a more general level, our results indicate that economic policies may not only affect 
private agents’ incentives, but also change their perception of what is fair and create entitlement 
or status quo effects. In the past, economists have concentrated their efforts on understanding 
the incentive effects of government policies. However, our results – in combination with other 
recent evidence [Madrian and Shea 2001; Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec 2003] demonstrating 
that seemingly innocuous situational details can have powerful behavioral effects – suggest that 
economists may gain substantially by also focusing their research on these other effects of 
government policies. The work by Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec [2003], for example, shows 
that arbitrary anchors have strong effects on subjects’ reservation prices. If arbitrary anchors are 
even able to affect reservation values, shouldn’t we also expect a government intervention as 
strong and as salient as an increase in minimum wages to influence reservation wages strongly? 
Thus, public policies are likely to affect behavior not only through changing incentives but also 
by shaping perceptions of entitlements and, thus, reservation values.  
In the following, we first present our experimental design. Then we show our results in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the extent to which the impact of minimum wages is due to 
the fact that minimum wages are necessarily a kind of wage guideline; we thus study the impact 
of nonbinding wage guidelines on actual wages and reservation wages in this section. Section 5 
discusses the applicability of our findings to labor markets outside the laboratory and suggests 
several further experiments that might provide a deeper understanding the minimum wage’s 
impact on reservation wages.  
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II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In this section, we present the experimental design. We first describe the experimental game, 
followed by a description of the treatments and procedures. Finally we discuss the behavioral 
predictions.  
II.A. The Experimental Game 
Workers are randomly matched to firms in each period of the experiment, and can only conclude 
a contract with the firm with which they are matched. There are 6 firms and 18 workers in each 
experimental session, i.e., each of the 6 firms is randomly matched with three workers in each 
period. Firms have identical revenue functions with labor as the only variable input and a 
decreasing marginal revenue product of labor. To hire workers, firms can submit a unitary wage 
offer w to the matched workers, i.e., wage discrimination is ruled out. Firms can make wage 
offers to all matched workers or to fewer workers. Workers do not know how many wage offers 
the firm makes; each individual worker only knows whether he or she received a wage offer.  
A worker can accept or reject w. If the worker rejects w, he or she is unemployed and 
earns nothing in this period. If a worker accepts the offer, a binding contract is concluded; the 
worker receives w and the firms’ revenue increases according to the marginal revenue the 
worker generates. Each firm’s revenue function is shown in Table I.  
Insert Table I about here  
Firms’ profits are given by total revenue minus wages. Thus an individual firm’s profit function 
is as follows: 
Firm
0, if no worker is employed
390 - , if one worker is employed
740 - 2 , if two workers are employed
1000 -3 , if three workers are employed
w
w
w
⎧⎪⎪Π = ⎨⎪⎪⎩
 
Workers’ payoffs depend on the wage offer and on whether the offer is accepted or rejected. 
Thus payoffs for workers are: 
 Worker
0, if no wage offer is received
0, if a wage offer is rejected
, if a wage offers is acceptedw
⎧⎪Π = ⎨⎪⎩
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Both workers’ and firms’ payoff functions are common knowledge among the participants. 
After all decisions in a period are made, payoffs are calculated and displayed on the subjects’ 
computer screens: firms are informed both about their own payoffs and those of the workers 
with whom they have been matched; workers, too, are informed both about their own payoffs 
and that of their firm. The next period begins after all subjects have received this payoff 
information. 
Since we were particularly interested in workers’ individual reservation wages, we used 
the strategy method to elicit workers’ acceptance decisions. To this end, workers were asked to 
indicate the lowest wage they would in fact be willing to accept before they knew which wage 
offer they actually received. If the wage offer actually received was lower than the worker’s 
acceptance threshold, the offer was automatically rejected, otherwise it was accepted. Note that 
the specification of an acceptance threshold determined a worker's complete strategy, because 
the worker implicitly stated his accept/reject response to every possible wage offer. Neither the 
firms nor the other workers were informed about an individual workers’ acceptance threshold. A 
firm was only informed about how many workers accepted its wage offer.  
The acceptance threshold represents a worker’s reservation wage. This information about 
reservation wages will prove useful for understanding the firms' behavioral responses to the 
introduction and the removal of minimum wages. In addition, the information about reservation 
wages enables us to implement a useful matching procedure. A large body of evidence now 
indicates that a significant share of experimental subjects exhibit a preference for fairness and 
reciprocity [Camerer 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000]. In addition, the strength of fairness motives 
differs among those subjects who care for fairness. Therefore, we expected both a significant 
share of the workers to exhibit positive reservation wages as well as heterogeneity in these 
reservation wages. This means that – on average – firms face an upward sloping labor supply 
schedule. Thus, if we play the experiment for a very large number of periods, firms are likely to 
learn the distribution of reservation wages, enabling them to respond appropriately to this 
distribution.  
However, repeating the same experiments for very many periods has also the drawback 
that subjects become bored or that their concentration diminishes over time, increasing the 
randomness of their behavior. Therefore, we only repeated each treatment condition for 15 
periods and increased the probability of a firm receiving a representative draw of matched 
workers by implementing the following matching protocol. We partitioned workers according to 
their reservation wage into three groups of equal size in each period such that there was a group 
with high, a group with intermediate and a group with low reservation wages. The random 
 
 
 
7
matching ensured that each firm faces one worker from each group. We conjectured that, 
regardless of the behavioral equilibrium (i.e., the stable behavioral pattern) in our setting, this 
matching protocol would speed up adjustment towards this stable pattern.   
II.B. Treatments and treatment orders 
To study the economic effects of a legally binding minimum wage, each session contains two 
treatments: a treatment without a minimum wage (NO) and one with a minimum wage (MW). 
Both treatments are played for 15 periods. The minimum wage is set at a level of 220, i.e., firms 
cannot offer wages below 220 in the MW treatment. Therefore, the range for permissible wage 
offers for firms is defined as follows: the constraint 0 ≤ w ≤ 1000 prevails in the NO treatment, 
while wage offers have to obey 220 ≤ w ≤ 1000 in the MW treatment. We implemented two 
treatment sequences to study potential sequence effects. In five sessions, subjects first 
completed the NO and then the MW treatment. The treatment order was reversed in the other 
five sessions.  
II.C. Subjects, payments, and procedures 
All subjects were students of the University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich (ETH). Each subject participated in only one session. Subjects were 
randomly subdivided into two groups before the start of the experiment; some were assigned the 
role of a firm and others the role of workers. The assigned roles remained fixed for the whole 
session. All interactions were anonymous, i.e., the subjects did not know the personal identities 
of their trading partners. 
To make sure that subjects fully understood the procedures and the payoff consequences 
of the available actions, each subject had to read a detailed set of instructions before the session 
started. Participants then had to answer several questions about the feasible actions and the 
payoff consequences of different actions. We only started a session after all subjects had 
correctly answered all questions. The exchange rate between experimental currency units 
(“points”) and real money was 150 Points = 1 Swiss Franc (~US $ 0.80). 
The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental 
software z-Tree [Fischbacher 1999]. We had 24 subjects (six firms and eighteen workers) in 
each of the ten sessions, yielding a total of 240 participants in the experiment. A session lasted 
approximately two hours and subjects earned on average 49 Swiss Francs (CHF 49 ~ US $ 40). 
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II.D. Behavioral hypotheses 
If we assume common knowledge of rationality and money-maximizing behavior, the predicted 
results of this experiment are straightforward. Since the outside option is zero, selfish workers 
accept every wage offer above or equal to zero, which the firms anticipate. Thus, firms offer a 
wage of one (or zero) to all three workers in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the NO treatment, 
and the workers accept.6 Full employment thus results, and firms reap almost all gains from 
trade. Firms cannot offer wages below 220 in the MW treatment due to the existence of a legal 
minimum wage, although workers would be willing to accept the same low wages as in the NO 
treatment. Since the minimum wage is less than the third worker’s marginal product, profit 
maximizing firms offer the minimum wage to all three workers. As in the NO treatment, all 
workers are employed. A further implication of common knowledge of rationality and 
selfishness is that the treatment order does not affect the predicted behavior in any treatment. 
We summarize the most important predictions of this approach as the  
 
Self-Interest Hypothesis: (a) Wages will be zero or one in the absence of a minimum wage and 
equal to 220 in the presence of the minimum wage. The treatment order does not affect 
wages in either treatment. 
(b) Reservation wages are zero or one in the absence of a minimum wage and do not 
exceed 220 in the presence of the minimum wage, irrespective of the treatment order. 
(c) Full employment prevails in both treatment conditions.  
 
As mentioned previously, however, there is considerable evidence for the existence of 
heterogeneous preferences for fairness and reciprocity. These preferences imply that a person is 
willing to sacrifice material payoff in order to punish either unfair behavior or unfair people, or 
to move payoffs closer to equality. In our context, for example, a worker could punish a firm for 
offering a low wage by rejecting the latter’s offer. Such rejection behaviors have been frequently 
observed in the ultimatum bargaining game [Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982; Camerer 
2003]. The equal split between the proposer and the responder is the salient (fair) reference 
point in this two-player game, and the responder often rejects low (unfair) bargaining offers, 
although this means that he earns nothing. To avoid rejections, the proposers typically offer on 
                                                 
6 Every strategy combination of the following form is a subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium: The firm offers a wage 
of one to all three workers, at least one worker accepts only positive wage offers and the other workers accept all 
non-negative wage offers. Additionally, there is also another subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, in which every 
worker accepts all non-negative wage offers and therefore the firm offers a wage of zero. 
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average between 70% and 80% of the equal split [Camerer 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000]. Thus, 
in our context, if firms anticipate that some workers will reject low offers, they also have an 
incentive to increase their wages beyond those the self-interest model predicts. Moreover, the 
existence of heterogeneous fairness preferences, in combination with restricted mobility of 
workers across firms, also means that firms do not face a flat, but an upward sloping labor 
supply schedule.7 
In the absence of precise knowledge about the distribution of fairness preferences in our 
subject pool, it is difficult to make precise quantitative predictions. However, one might 
speculate that – similar to the ultimatum game – firms will distribute the available revenue such 
that workers earn 70% to 80% of the equal split. If a firm employs three workers, the available 
revenue is 1000 and the equal split implies a wage of 250. Thus, if workers receive on average 
70% to 80% of the equal split, the average wage should be between 175 and 200. If this 
conjecture holds true, the minimum wage will also increase actual wages in the presence of 
fairness preferences.  
For our purposes it is important whether fairness preferences are based solely on the 
allocation of final payoffs across firms and workers – as in models of inequity aversion [Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000] – or whether they are also shaped by beliefs 
about other players’ intentions [Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and 
Fischbacher forthcoming]. The difference between these two approaches can be nicely 
illustrated in the context of a simplified ultimatum game where the proposer only has two ways 
of dividing up a bargaining cake of $10 [Falk et al. 2003]: In the “fair” condition, the proposer 
can only offer 5:5 (5 for herself and 5 for the responder) or 8:2. In the “unfair” condition the 
proposer can only offer 8:2 or 10:0. If the responder only cares about the final allocation of 
payoffs, the rejection rate of the 8:2 offer should be identical across both conditions. However, 
an offer of 8:2 in the “fair” treatment reveals that the proposer is very unfair because she could 
have offered 5:5. In contrast, an offer of 8:2 in the “unfair” treatment does not reveal an unfair 
intention because the only alternative was 10:0. In fact, the rejection rate of the 8:2 offer is 44% 
in the “fair” treatment and only 9% in the “unfair” treatment in the Falk et al. [2003] 
                                                 
7 We believe that some restrictions on workers’ mobility also prevail in field settings because of the many frictions 
that are present in real world labor markets. Mobility costs and search costs in a world of imperfect information 
may well generate upward sloping labor supply schedules for individual firms. Manning [2003], for example, 
provides substantial evidence in favor of this view. In addition, a simple thought experiment suggests that the labor 
supply schedule individual firms face is not completely flat: Do we expect all employees to quit if a firm cuts all 
wages by one percent? The likely answer to this question is “no” and, therefore, the labor supply schedule is likely 
to be upward sloping. The real question, therefore, is how strongly individual firms’ labor supply schedules are 
upward sloping. Empirical evidence alone, and not assumption, can answer this question. 
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experiments, indicating that the set of feasible alternatives affects the responders’ fairness 
attributions and hence their rejection behavior. 
These findings suggest that the minimum wage is also likely to affect the workers’ fairness 
perceptions and, hence, their reservation wages in our experiment. A wage of 220, for example, 
may be perceived as very fair in the absence of a minimum wage because the firm also could 
have offered much less whereas a wage at the legal minimum of 220 may be perceived as rather 
unfair in the MW treatment because the firm was forced to offer that wage anyway. Evidence in 
favor of this view comes from Brandts and Charness [2004] who introduced a minimum wage in 
the context of a labor market with worker moral hazard where workers’ fairness concerns drive 
effort. They show that workers provide less effort for the same wage level in the presence of the 
minimum wage, lending support to the view that the impact of minimum wages on workers' 
attributions of fairness intentions to firms partially shapes their effort responses. Workers cannot 
choose an effort level in our experiment, but they can choose their reservation wages according 
to their fairness perceptions.  
Note, however, that none of the models mentioned above, based on the idea that 
attributions of fairness intentions shape behavior, predict asymmetrical rejection behavior in 
response to the introduction and the removal of a minimum wage. According to these models, if 
the minimum wage is abolished, it will no longer affect workers’ attributions of fairness 
intentions to firms. In view of these considerations we can now formulate the  
 
Fairness Hypothesis: (a) Wages will be much higher than zero in the absence of the minimum 
wage. The introduction of a legal minimum wage further raises actual wages, and the 
removal of the minimum wage reduces wages. Actual wages before the introduction 
and after the removal of the minimum wage law are indistinguishable.  
(b) The introduction of a legal minimum wage raises reservation wages, and the 
removal of the minimum wage decreases reservations wages. Reservation wages before 
the introduction and after the removal of the minimum wage are indistinguishable. 
(c) Underemployment may occur already in the absence of a minimum wage and 
minimum wages generate ambiguous employment effects, i.e., employment may 
increase, decrease or remain unaffected. 
 
Part (c) of the fairness hypothesis follows from the assumption of heterogeneous fairness 
preferences. If this assumption holds, individual firms face upward sloping labor supply 
schedules which may render it optimal to offer wages some workers reject. It is also well known 
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[see, e.g., Bhaskar and To 1998 or Boal and Ransom 1997] that increases in the minimum wage 
may not reduce but increase employment under these circumstances because the hiring of 
additional workers can only be accomplished in the absence of a minimum wage if all workers’ 
wages increase. Minimum wages may also have this effect in our experimental setting. 
Depending on the level and the degree of heterogeneity in reservation wages, hiring less than 
three workers may be profit maximizing. For example, if reservation wages of the three matched 
workers are (0, 10 and 100), hiring three instead of two workers produces marginal costs of 
3×100 – 2×10 = 280, which exceeds the third worker’s marginal revenue, which is only 260. It 
is therefore optimal for the firm to hire two instead of three workers in this case. The 
introduction of a minimum of 220 reduces the marginal cost of labor from 280 to 220, which is 
less than the third worker’s marginal revenue. Thus, hiring all three workers may be profitable 
in the presence of the minimum wage if the legal minimum leaves reservation wages unaffected 
or does not affect them very strongly. 
However, if minimum wages cause a strong enough increase in reservation wages it is also 
possible that firms reduce employment. If, for example, the distribution of reservation wages is 
(30, 80, 130) before the introduction of the minimum wage, the marginal cost of employing the 
third worker is given by 3×130 – 2×80 = 230 which is below the third worker's marginal 
revenue. Therefore, a profit maximizing firm employs all three workers. If the minimum wage 
shifts the distribution of reservation wages to (30, 80, 240) the marginal cost of the third worker 
equals 3×240 – 2×220 = 280 which exceeds the revenue produced by the third worker. Thus, the 
minimum wage lowers employment in this case. These examples illustrate that much depends 
on the concrete distribution of reservation wages and on the quantitative impact of minimum 
wages on reservation wages. No concrete quantitative employment predictions are possible in 
the absence of knowledge about these characteristics of the distribution.  
 
III. RESULTS 
In this section we present our main results. We concentrate on the economic effects of 
introducing a minimum wage in Section 3.1. We start by reporting how the minimum wage 
regime affects wages. These results are subsequently explained in the light of workers’ 
reservation wages. Next we investigate and explain the employment effects of introducing a 
minimum wage. We analyze the effects of a removal of minimum wages on wages and 
employment in Section 3.2. Special emphasis is given to potential asymmetries. We explore 
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whether the impact of a minimum wage is affected by the treatment sequence, i.e., whether we 
consider the introduction sequence or the removal sequence.  
III.A. Introducing the minimum wage – effects on wages, reservation wages, and 
employment 
Our first result concerns the wages paid to workers in the introduction sequence where the 
minimum wage is initially absent and introduced in the second phase of a session. The main 
findings can be summarized as follows: 
Result 1 (wages): In the absence of a minimum wage law, wages are much higher than 
predicted by the self-interest model; however, the vast majority of wages is below the 
minimum wage level of 220. Nevertheless, in the presence of a minimum wage law, the 
majority of wages is not just raised to the level of the minimum wage but above that 
level. 
This result is consistent with part (a) of the fairness hypothesis. Support for Result 1 comes from 
Figure I and regression (1) of Table II. Figure I shows a histogram of all wages paid to workers, 
both in the NO and the MW conditions, with wage intervals in steps of 10. As is obvious from 
this figure, wages in the NO condition (grey bars) are much higher than the self-interest model 
predicts. On average, firms pay wages of 188 and the standard deviation is 32.1. The lowest 
wage paid in the NO condition is 25 and more than 94 percent of all wage payments are equal to 
or above 150. 
Figure I also shows that wages increase substantially after the introduction of the 
minimum wage (black bars). The average wage in the MW condition is 237.7 with a standard 
deviation of 11.1. The treatment differences in wages are highly significant, as can be inferred 
from regression (1) of Table II. We regress wages on a minimum wage dummy, which takes the 
value one if the observation comes from the MW treatment and a zero otherwise.8 The 
coefficient of the minimum wage dummy is positive and significant on any conventional level. 
Insert Figure I about here 
Insert Table II about here 
                                                 
8 Since observations within a session may be dependent, all reported robust standard errors are clustered on 
sessions. This holds for all regressions in this paper. 
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Figure I illustrates a further interesting observation. Note that many wages in the MW condition 
exceed 220, the level of the minimum wage. Only seven percent of all wages are exactly at the 
level of the minimum wage, all other wages are higher than 220. This “spillover” effect of 
minimum wages is remarkable, since the minimum wage was binding in the sense that without 
the minimum wage, only 8 percent of the wages were above 220. Put differently, while 92 
percent of the wages were below 220 before the introduction of the minimum wage, firms 
subject to the minimum wage regime pay wages above 220 in 93 percent of the cases. 
Result 1 raises two important questions: 1) Why do wages attain their high level in the 
absence of a minimum wage law? 2) Why do wages exceed the minimum wage in the presence 
of the law? Part (b) of the fairness hypothesis provides answers to both of these questions. The 
hypothesis in part (b) predicts that workers’ fairness preferences cause reservation wages that 
are substantially above zero and the introduction of the minimum wage is predicted to cause a 
further rise in reservation wages. This change in reservation wages may then induce firms to pay 
wages above the minimum wage. Our next result shows whether we indeed observe these 
predicted regularities in reservation wages. 
Result 2 (reservation wages): In the absence of the minimum wage law, individual reservation 
wages are much higher than the self-interest model predicts, but almost all of them are 
below the minimum wage level of 220. However, in the presence of the minimum wage 
law, a large share of the subjects exhibit reservation wages above the minimum wage 
level. 
Support for Result 2 comes from Figure II which shows a histogram of stated reservation wages 
in the NO condition (grey bars) and the MW condition (black bars). Reservation wage intervals 
are in steps of 10. Figure II reveals that only about 8 percent of all reservation wages are 
between 0 and 10 in the NO condition, i.e., only a small minority of workers chooses reservation 
wages close to the level the self-interest model predicts. In contrast, more than 82 percent of the 
chosen reservation wages are at least 100, 66 percent are at least 150 and 28 percent are 200 or 
higher. However, only 9 percent are equal to or higher than the later minimum wage of 220. The 
resulting mean reservation wage is 145. 
The distribution of reservation wages in the NO condition is consistent with the fairness 
hypothesis. Workers with high acceptance thresholds could earn much more if they were willing 
to reduce their thresholds. This can be shown empirically by regressing the workers’ earnings on 
their reservation wages. This results in a strongly negative relationship in the NO condition, 
with a “reservation wage coefficient” of -.499 and a t-statistic of -15.6 (OLS regression with 
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robust standard errors, clustering on sessions). Apparently, many workers are willing to accept 
the costs of rejecting low offers.  
Figure II also shows that the introduction of the minimum wage affects reservation wages. 
While 91 percent of the reservation wages are below the minimum wage level in the NO 
condition, 49 percent of reservation wages exceed the minimum wage in the MW condition. 
This result suggests that minimum wages systematically affect what is considered to be a fair 
wage. Many workers seem to perceive a wage of 220, which would have been considered as fair 
and quite generous in the NO treatment, as unfairly low in the MW treatment. 
Insert Figure II about here 
As mentioned above, fairness preferences may make it profitable for the firms to pay relatively 
high wages in the NO treatment, while the change in reservation wages due to the minimum 
wage law may make the payment of wages above the minimum wage in the MW treatment 
profitable. To check this conjecture, we computed the firms’ profit maximizing wages across 
treatments and for each session, given the workers' observed reservation wage schedule. 
Remember that three workers are assigned randomly to each firm at the beginning of a period. 
After indicating their reservation wages, the workers are subdivided into three groups: a low (l), 
a medium (m), and a high (h) reservation wage group. Subsequently, each firm is randomly 
matched with one worker out of each of these three groups. Assuming that firms know the 
distribution of reservation wages, they choose their wage offers in order to maximize the 
following expected payoff:9 
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where pi is the probability that a worker in the reservation wage group i ∈ {l, m, h} accepts the 
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9 To a first approximation, the proposers in the ultimatum game typically make offers that maximize their expected 
monetary earnings. For example, the modal offer was close to the offer that maximized the proposers’ expected 
earnings in each of the 4 countries in which Roth et al. [1991] conducted ultimatum games. Therefore, we assume 
that firms in our setting maximize their expected monetary payoff.   
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The profit maximizing wage w* equalizes the marginal revenue of a higher offer with its 
marginal cost. As in a standard monopsony problem, the marginal cost of a wage increase not 
only consists of the wage multiplied by the expected change in employment, but also includes 
the additional wage costs for the expected employment realized at the previous wage level. 
Given the actual distribution of reservation wages in the experiment, it is possible to 
calculate the profit maximizing wage and employment for each firm in each period.10 Table III 
shows the average of the resulting profit maximizing wage offers together with average wages 
actually realized for each session in the NO and the MW treatment. 
Insert Table III about here 
This table reveals several interesting findings. First, the profit maximizing wage across sessions 
in the NO condition lies between 151 and 189. This explains our finding that wages greatly 
exceed the low level the self-interest model predicts. Second, on average firms pay wages that 
closely approximate profit maximizing wages. The relative differences between profit 
maximizing and actual average wages per session are between 0.29 percent (Session 4) and 8.7 
percent (Session 5). This suggests that firms well understood the monopsonistic profit-
maximization problem. Third, the correlation between the means of the profit maximizing and 
realized wages across sessions is positive and significant (Spearman’s rho = .900, p=.0374). 
This shows that firms not only understood the maximization problem but also responded to the 
session specific distribution of reservation wages. This is quite remarkable, given that firms 
were not informed about the distribution of reservation wages but had to discover it in a trial and 
error process. Fourth, Table III shows that, as a consequence of the increase in reservation 
wages in the MW condition, profit maximizing wages in fact exceed 220. This provides an 
explanation for the spillover effect reported in Result 1, i.e., the fact that firms pay wages in the 
MW condition that are not only higher than those in the NO condition, but also in excess of 220. 
Moreover, the difference between profit maximizing and actual wages is rather small, as it is in 
the NO condition, indicating that firms well understood the optimization problem. The relative 
difference between profit maximizing and actual wages is in most sessions below one percent in 
the MW treatment. 
                                                 
10 We calculate the wage that maximizes expected profits in each period of every session, given the matching 
procedure described above and assuming that firms have perfect knowledge about the distribution of workers’ 
reservation wages. 
 
 
 
16
In Section 2, we argued that firms may not be willing to employ all three matched workers 
when reservation wages are heterogeneous. Figure II shows that workers exhibit a considerable 
degree of heterogeneity with respect to their reservation wages in the NO condition. As firms’ 
wage offers are close to optimal (see Table III), it is therefore likely that employment is lower 
than predicted by the self-interest model. In principle, the introduction of a minimum wage 
could therefore lead to an increase in employment, because firms in the MW condition are 
exogenously forced to pay a minimum wage far above the observed average wage level in the 
NO condition. However, we also know that minimum wages lead to a considerable increase in 
reservation wages so that workers reject wage offers under a minimum wage regime that they 
would have accepted in the absence of a minimum wage law. Depending on the strength of each 
effect, the minimum wage law can therefore increase or decrease employment. Result 3 
summarizes our findings concerning the employment effects of the introduction of a minimum 
wage: 
Result 3 (employment): Employment in the absence of the minimum wage is much lower than 
the self-interest model predicts. The introduction of minimum wages causes a 
significant increase in employment. However, due to the increase in workers’ 
reservation wages, the employment effect of the minimum wage is smaller than it would 
have been had workers’ reservation wages remained stable. 
Support for Result 3 comes from regression (2) in Table II where we regress firm level 
employment on a constant and a dummy for minimum wages. Regression (2) shows that 
employment is clearly below the level predicted by the self interest hypothesis in the NO 
condition. Instead of three workers, 2.1 workers are employed on average. In fact, employment 
per firm does not exceed 2.4 in any single session of the NO treatment. The reason for why 
firms employ less than three workers has to do with the level and the heterogeneity of workers’ 
reservation wages. The reason for the low employment level is not that firms submit too few job 
offers. In fact, firms submit three job offers in 96.2 percent of the cases. However, 28.9 percent 
of the offers are turned down on average. 
The minimum wage dummy in regression (2) also indicates that the introduction of the 
minimum wage increases employment per firm by roughly 0.3 workers (14 percent) – from 2.1 
workers per firm in the NO treatment to 2.4 workers per firm in the MW treatment. The positive 
employment effect of minimum wages occurs in each of the five sessions and is likely to be a 
consequence of firms optimal wage policy. In a previous version of this paper [Falk, Fehr and 
Zehnder 2005] we explicitly compared profit maximizing employment levels – given the 
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observed distribution of reservation wages – and actual employment levels. In each session 
profit maximizing employment and actual employment is higher in the presence of a minimum 
wage.  
III.B. Removing the minimum wage – economic effects and asymmetries 
Up to this point, we have studied the economic effects of introducing a minimum wage. In the 
following we explore the minimum wage effects on wages and employment when the minimum 
wage is removed rather than introduced. In particular, we will focus on the question whether the 
economic effects are symmetrical, i.e., whether the treatment order affects the treatment effects. 
Since the treatments (NO and MW) are exactly the same regardless of the treatment order, one 
would expect that removing the minimum wage causes the same absolute changes in wages, 
reservation wages and employment as the introduction of the minimum wage. In fact, the 
fairness hypothesis predicts that the effect of the minimum wage on these variables is the same 
regardless of the treatment order. Result 4, 5 and 6 show, however, that these predictions are not 
consistent with the data. 
Result 4 (asymmetry in wages): The temporary introduction of the minimum wage has 
permanent effects on actual wages, i.e., even after the removal of the minimum wage, 
actual wages remain close to the previous minimum wage level. Thus, pre- and post-
minimum wage economies exhibit significantly different wages, although the two 
economies are identical in all exogenous parameters. 
 
Support for Result 4 comes from Figures III and IV and from regression (1) in Table IV. Figure 
III shows employed workers' average wages over time for both treatments in both sequences. 
The solid line shows wages for the introduction sequence, the dashed line shows wages for the 
removal sequence. Wages in the MW treatments of both the removal and introduction sequences 
are very similar. In the removal sequence, 11 percent of the paid wages are exactly at the level 
of the minimum wage, while 89 percent of the wages are higher. In the introduction sequence, 7 
percent of the paid wages are exactly at the level of the minimum wage, while 93 percent of the 
wages are higher. This shows that the spillover effect described in Result 1 appears, regardless 
of whether we introduce the minimum wage at the beginning of the experiment or after subjects 
experienced an economy without the minimum wage. In addition, the mean wage is exactly 
237.7 in both sequences. 
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Insert Figure III and Figure IV about here 
While wages in the MW conditions are identical, wages in the NO conditions differ 
substantially. Whereas before the introduction of the minimum wage the mean wage in the NO 
treatment (see section 3.1) is equal to 188, mean wages remain at 213 after removal of the 
minimum wage. Thus the previous minimum wage strongly affects wages in the NO condition 
of the removal sequence. Further evidence for this result is found in Figure IV, which displays 
the distribution of wages in the NO conditions of both treatment sequences. Our results show 
clearly that high wages (above 200) are chosen much more frequently in the NO treatment after 
the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. The results of regression (1) in 
Table IV further support this, showing that the wage difference between the introduction and the 
removal sequence is highly significant. Wages are regressed on a minimum wage dummy, a 
dummy for the removal sequence and the interaction of the two.  
Insert Table IV about here 
The minimum wage dummy takes the value one if the observation comes from the MW 
treatment and zero otherwise. Likewise the dummy for the removal sequences takes the value 1 
if the observation comes from the removal sequence and zero otherwise. Finally, the interaction 
variable “minimum wage dummy×dummy for the removal sequence” is an interaction term of 
these two dummy variables. Since we omitted the dummy for the introduction sequence, the 
constant in this regression measures the average wage in the NO treatment of the introduction 
sequence. The minimum wage dummy measures the wage increase due to the minimum wage in 
the introduction sequence. It is positive and significant. The dummy for the removal sequence 
measures the difference in actual wages in the NO condition across treatment sequences. The 
coefficient of this dummy indicates that wages in the NO condition are 25.7 units higher after 
the removal of the minimum wage law than before its introduction. The interaction term 
measures the difference in the minimum wage effect across sequences. The coefficient of the 
interaction term is significantly negative, indicating that the impact of the minimum wage on 
actual wages is smaller in the removal sequence than in the introduction sequence. Thus, the 
results of the regression indicate that a minimum wage law has lasting effects on actual wages 
even after the removal of the law. 
Why do firms pay higher wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its 
introduction? A key factor in answering this question is the impact of minimum wages on 
reservation wages. 
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Result 5 (asymmetry in reservation wages): Reservation wages are higher after the removal of 
the minimum wage than before its introduction. 
Support for Result 5 comes from Figure V. It shows the distribution of reservation wages in the 
two NO conditions, i.e., before the introduction (grey bars) and after the removal of the 
minimum wage (black bars). The figure reveals that the relative frequency of high reservation 
wages is much higher after the removal of the minimum wage. While only 28 percent of the 
reservation wages in the NO treatment are 200 or higher in the introduction sequence, this 
number is 52 percent in the removal sequence. For wages above or equal to 220, the respective 
numbers are 9 and 23 percent. 
Figure V also shows that very low reservation wages are chosen more frequently after the 
removal of the minimum wage. While in the introduction sequence only 10 percent of the stated 
reservation wages are below 30, this is the case for 17 percent of the reservation wages in the 
removal sequence. Taken together, these observations lead to the following aggregate picture: 
The average reservation wage is 145 before the minimum wage is introduced and 157 after its 
removal. The respective median values are 150 and 200. The big difference between median and 
average values comes from the shift at the lower end of the reservation wage distribution. While 
the small increase in very low reservation wages strongly influences the average reservation 
wage in the removal sequence, this change does not affect the median. However, the probability 
of being assigned a worker with a very low reservation wage remains rather small for firms; 
thus, the data on average reservation wages is likely to underestimate the economic impact of 
the former minimum wage on actual wages in the NO condition of the removal sequence. The 
change in medians, therefore, better captures the likely economic relevance of the increase in 
reservation wages for the formation of actual wages; the medians suggest that reservation wages 
are strongly influenced by the previous minimum wage law. 
Insert Figure V about here 
The results of regression (2) and (3) in Table IV further support the finding that the previous 
minimum wage law affects reservation wages in the NO condition. In regression (2), reservation 
wages are regressed on a minimum wage dummy, a dummy for the removal sequence, and the 
interaction of the two. The same regression model is employed in regression (3) for medians of 
reservation wages per period, session, and treatment. The constant measures the reservation 
wage in the NO treatment of the introduction sequence. The dummy for the removal sequence 
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measures the difference between the reservation wages in the NO treatments across sequences. 
The coefficient of this dummy is positive in both regressions, but only significant in regression 
(3): median reservation wages are thus significantly higher in the post minimum wage economy 
than in the pre minimum wage economy.  
The sum of the dummy for the removal sequence and the interaction term measures the 
difference in the two MW conditions.11 In both regressions, the effect is basically zero (11.70 – 
11.75 = -0.05 respectively 26.67 – 27.47 = – 0.8) and insignificant [F-Test for the hypothesis 
that the sum of the dummy for removal sequence and the interaction term equals zero, p = 0.709 
and p = 0.713, respectively], which indicates that the treatment sequence does not affect 
reservation wages in the MW conditions. 
So far we have shown that the minimum wage continues to affect the distribution of 
reservation wages after its elimination. However, the question remains open whether this effect 
should change the wage setting behavior of profit maximizing firms. We calculated the profit 
maximizing wages given the different distributions of reservation wages before the introduction 
and after the removal of the minimum wage. Our calculations show that it was indeed optimal 
for firms to pay different wages in the pre and the post minimum wage economy. When we 
aggregate, we get a mean (median) profit maximizing wage of 184 (200) for all NO sessions of 
the removal sequence compared to 177 (180) for all NO sessions in the introduction sequence, 
respectively. The same calculations for the MW treatments reveal that there are no differences 
between the two sequences. Mean (median) profit maximizing wages are 233 (230) for the MW 
sessions in the introduction sequence and 231 (230) for the MW sessions in the removal 
sequence. These calculations are in line with the fact that wages in the MW treatments are 
practically identical, regardless of the sequence of treatments. 
Next, we examine whether the asymmetric response of wages and reservation wages also 
led to an asymmetric response in employment.  
Result 6 (asymmetry in employment): The introduction of the minimum wage causes 
significantly larger employment changes than its removal. In particular, the 
                                                 
11 Intuitively, this claim holds for the following reason. The MW dummy takes on a value of one in the MW 
condition of the introduction sequence, while all three dummy variables in the regression take on a value of one in 
the MW condition of the removal sequence. Thus, the difference between the MW conditions in the two different 
sequences is represented in the regression by the situation where the dummy for the removal sequence and the 
interaction term take on a value of one.  
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introduction causes a significant increase in employment, whereas the removal leaves 
employment basically unchanged. 
Regression (4) in Table IV shows that the employment effects of the minimum wage differ 
significantly between the introduction and the removal sequences. The significantly positive 
coefficient of the minimum wage dummy indicates that employment increases after the 
introduction of the minimum wage. Recall that the interaction term measures the difference in 
the effect of minimum wages across sequences. Thus, the negative coefficient of this term 
indicates that the employment effect of the minimum wage is smaller in the removal sequence 
than in the introduction sequence. Finally the regression also shows that there is no significant 
difference in employment between the NO and the MW treatments in the removal sequence 
because the sum of the minimum wage dummy and the interaction term are close to zero and 
insignificant [0.291 – 0.258 = 0.033, F-Test for the hypothesis that the sum of the minimum 
wage dummy and the interaction term equals zero, p = 0.464].12  
IV. SOURCES OF THE MINIMUM WAGE EFFECT 
One of our most important findings concerns the impact of the minimum wage on workers’ 
reservation wages. Workers behaved as if they perceived the same wage to be less fair after the 
introduction of the minimum wage because they rejected wage offers that they had previously 
accepted. Therefore, the minimum wage seems to affect workers’ views of what constitutes a 
fair wage. If this conjecture is true, then other interventions that change workers’ fairness 
perceptions may have similar effects. In particular, nonbinding wage guidelines may also raise 
workers' reservation wages if they are set above the wage which previously prevailed. In many 
economies, employer or employee organizations or government institutions sometimes propose 
wage guidelines. We conducted further control sessions to examine the conjecture regarding the 
effects of wage guidelines. Subjects in these sessions first experienced the situation without a 
wage guideline (and without minimum wages) for 15 periods, after which we introduced the 
guideline. The level of the wage guideline was set at 220 – the level of the minimum wage in the 
previous sessions. Like the minimum wage, the guideline was common knowledge among the 
                                                 
12 The sum of the minimum wage dummy and the interaction term gives us the difference between the NO 
condition and the MW condition of the removal sequence for the following reason: all three dummy variables in the 
regression take on a value of one in the MW condition of the removal sequence, while only the dummy for the 
removal sequence takes on a value of one in the NO condition of this sequence.  
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subjects and it was made clear that the guideline only constituted a nonbinding rule about the 
lower bound of firms' wage offers.  
We conducted two sessions with wage guidelines. Figure VI shows that the introduction of 
the wage guideline increased reservation wages considerably. The average reservation wage 
without the guideline is 115 whereas the mean reservation wage with the guideline is 154. The 
proportion of observations at 200 and 220 is much higher with the wage guideline. However, we 
observe almost no reservation wages above 220 in the presence of the wage guideline. Thus, 
although the guideline raises reservation wages, the increase is smaller than after the 
introduction of a binding minimum wage because 49 percent of the stated reservation wages 
were even above 220 in the latter case (see Figure II). 
Insert Figure VI about here 
The increase in reservation wages is also associated with an increase in actual wages. The 
average wage in the treatment without the guideline is 175, while average wages are 206 in the 
guideline treatment – a rise of 31 units. Recall from Section 3.1 that the introduction of a 
minimum wage increased wages by 50 units. Thus, a nonnegligible part of the wage increase 
legally binding minimum wages cause may be attributed to the guideline effects of minimum 
wages. The change in employment rounds up the effects of wage guidelines. Average 
employment per firm is 2.21 without the guideline whereas average employment increases to 
2.47 in the presence of the guideline. Thus, as in the case of a legally binding minimum wage, 
the wage increase the guideline causes seems to ease firms’ labor supply constraint and 
contributes to a higher employment level.  
V. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION 
Almost all economic reasoning is based on the assumption that changes in the incentives people 
face are the predominant cause in behavioral changes. Therefore, economic policy analysis 
focuses on how policy shapes incentives. However, the results of this paper suggest that 
economic policies have deeper effects. Subjects in our experiments exhibited higher reservation 
wages after the introduction of a minimum wage, suggesting that minimum wages affect their 
fairness perceptions. A wage once considered fair may no longer be perceived as such after the 
introduction of a minimum wage. Moreover, we observe that reservation wages remain higher 
after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. One reason for this 
asymmetry may be that the minimum wage, or the high wages associated with its existence, 
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generates feelings of entitlement which persist after the removal of a binding minimum wage. 
The individual perceives entitlements as rights, associated with a motivational disposition to 
defend them [Schlicht 1984, p. 24]. Important sources for entitlements are past allocations, 
which result in a “sense of ownership in the status quo” [Zajac 1995, p. 121]. Applied to our 
context, we speculate that once workers have been exposed to a minimum wage, they become 
used to receiving a relatively high wage. This experience may create entitlements, i.e., workers 
think they have a right to receive high wages and are willing to defend them. As a consequence, 
they set relatively high reservation wages even after the elimination of the minimum wage.  
Although the introduction of a minimum wage also led to a positive employment effect in 
our experiment, one should not conclude from this that a positive employment effect will also 
prevail in the real world because the number of firms was fixed in our experiment. If we had 
allowed for the entry and exit of firms, the employment effects might well have been negative 
because the minimum wage decreased profits substantially. In addition, if we had permitted 
endogenous investment choices, the profit-decreasing effect of minimum wages would probably 
have reduced the capital stock and hence employment. Also, much depends on the concrete 
quantitative details both in reality as well as in our experiments, such as the slope of the labor 
supply schedule. However, one robust implication for employment emerges from the positive 
effect of minimum wages on reservation wages. This effect means that the standard approach – 
which precludes an impact of minimum wages on the labor supply schedule – may 
underestimate the negative employment effect of minimum wages under competitive conditions. 
Likewise, labor market models assuming monopsonistic competition may overestimate the 
positive employment effect of minimum wages if they neglect that minimum wages tend to shift 
the labor supply curve.  
In order to further assess the applicability of our findings to situations outside the 
laboratory it is also important to stress that only vertical fairness concerns could play a role in 
our experiment because all workers within a firm received the same wage and they did not know 
the wages other firms paid. Thus, the main fairness issue for an individual subject in the role of 
a worker was how much he or she earned relative to the marginal or the average product of 
labor. Fairness comparisons among workers within the same firm may, however, play an even 
more important role for the impact of minimum wages on reservation wages in real labor 
markets. Horizontal fairness concerns may be a powerful force that may explain the 
anomalously low utilization of subminimum wages because such concerns imply that workers 
with similar tasks should be paid similar wages regardless of whether the employer could pay a 
subminimum wage to some of them. This conjecture is worth testing in future experiments by 
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implementing a minimum wage law that covers only part of the workers. Likewise, fairness 
concerns among workers with different jobs may generate spillover effects because the 
reservation wage of more highly skilled workers may depend on the actual wages of unskilled 
workers who earn more after an increase in minimum wages. This conjecture could also be 
tested by assigning different workers different productivities in the experiment. Finally, it would 
be interesting to know how nonbinding minimum wages or minimum wage laws that are 
incompletely enforced affect both reservation wages and actual wages. Our wage guideline 
treatment was only a first step in this direction and much remains to be done to fully understand 
the impact of minimum wage laws on reservation wages. At a more general level, we believe 
that research efforts that examine how economic policies shape the perceived fairness of the 
interactions between private agents and the perceived entitlements will have a high return and 
may enable researchers to explain hitherto puzzling phenomena. 
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TABLE I 
FIRMS’ REVENUE FUNCTION 
Employed workers Total revenue Marginal revenue
0 0 -
1 390 390
2 740 350
3 1000 260
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
EFFECTS OF INTRODUCING A MINIMUM WAGE ON WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: wage employment
Minimum wage dummy       50.11***     .291***
(7.46) (.048)
Constant       187.58***      2.10***
(8.38) (.078)
Number of observations 2021 900
Prob > F .003 .0038
R-squared .533 .0357
Note: OLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered on sessions in parentheses, *** indicates 
significance at the 1-percent level. The minimum wage dummy is 1 if a minimum wage exists and 0 
otherwise.  
 
 
 
TABLE III 
PROFIT MAXIMIZING WAGES AND ACTUAL WAGES IN THE ABSENCE AND PRESENCE OF A 
MINIMUM WAGE 
Session number S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1-5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1-5
Profit maximizing 
wage 177 183 151 189 184 177 233 227 237 238 232 233
Actual wage 165 172 154 189 200 176 234 228 237 238 243 236
Note: The table shows averages for the individual sessions S1, S2, …, S5 as well as for all session together
(S1-S5). In these sessions the minimum wage was introduced in the second phase of a session. 
Minimum wage absent Minimum wage present
 
 
 
 
TABLE IV 
EFFECTS OF AN INTRODUCTION VS. REMOVAL OF A MINIMUM WAGE ON WAGES, RESERVATION 
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: wage
reservation 
wage
median 
reservation 
wage employment
Minimum wage dummy 50.11*** 78.31*** 64.01*** .291***
(7.03) (3.52) (4.44) (.046)
Dummy for removal sequence 25.70*** 11.70 26.67** .167
(8.85) (9.57) (8.84) (.095)
-25.70*** -11.75 -27.47**) -.258***
(7.53) (9.83) (8.89) (.063)
Constant 187.58*** 145.16*** 161.69*** 2.10***
(7.91) (4.71) (4.04) (.074)
Number of obs. 4076 5400 300 1800
Prob > F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0008
R-squared . 472 .256 .761 .020
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on sessions in parentheses, *** indicates significance at the 1-percent 
level., ** indicates significance at the 5-percent level. Median reservation wages are calculated per period, 
session and treatment. In the removal sequence the MW treatment takes place before the NO treatment, in the 
introduction sequence the MW treatment comes after the NO treatment.
Minimum wage dummy × dummy
for removal sequence
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FIGURE I 
Distribution of Wages in the Absence and the Presence of a Minimum Wage  
(Minimum Wage is introduced in the Second Phase of a Session) 
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FIGURE II 
Distribution of Reservation Wages in the Absence and the Presence of a Minimum Wage 
(Minimum Wage is introduced in the Second Phase of a Session) 
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FIGURE III 
Average Wages of Employed Workers in Different Treatment Sequences 
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FIGURE IV 
Distribution of Wages before the Introduction and after the Removal of the Minimum Wage 
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FIGURE V 
Distribution of Reservation Wages before the Introduction and after the Removal of the 
Minimum Wage 
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FIGURE VI 
Distribution of Reservation Wages in the Absence and Presence of a Nonbinding Wage 
Guideline 
